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Abstract 
This paper proposes distinctions between guilt and two forms of shame: guilt arises 
from a violated norm and is characterised by a focus on specific behaviour; shame can 
be characterised by a threatened social image (Image Shame) or a threatened moral 
essence (Moral Shame). Applying this analysis to group-based emotions, three 
correlational studies are reported, set in the context of atrocities committed by 
(British) ingroup members during the Iraq war (Ns, 147, 256, 399). Results showed 
that the two forms of shame could be distinguished. Moreover, once the other form of 
shame was controlled for, they were differently related with orientations towards the 
outgroup: Image Shame was associated with negative orientations, whereas Moral 
Shame had associations with positive outgroup orientations. These associations were 
distinct from the associations of guilt and rejection. Study 3 used a longitudinal design 




Key words: Shame, Guilt, Apology, Avoidance. 
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Following prolonged media criticism, the chief executive of a multi-national 
corporation appears at a press conference to apologise for an incident involving one 
of their operations that has created major environmental pollution which threatens 
the health and livelihoods of a nearby community. In his statement he says his 
company is ashamed that a small minority of its workers have been negligent in 
causing the accident. He seems worried about how his company’s image may now be 
damaged by the incident and quickly leaves the press conference after making his 
statement. 
The leader of a country makes a public apology to the aboriginal people of her 
country for their historical mistreatment at the hands of the non-indigenous majority. 
In her statement she says that such oppression has brought shame on her country and 
is incompatible with its core moral values. She promises to implement a new 
programme of cultural and economic regeneration for them.  
 
These two – not entirely fictitious – examples illustrate something important about the 
ways in which group members – in this case, group leaders – can respond emotionally 
to the knowledge that others in their group have wrongly harmed another group. Both 
protagonists mention the word ‘shame’ in their statements, but the rhetoric and 
publicly expressed intentions differ. In the first case, the CEO seems mainly 
concerned about the public image of his company, seems to be reacting defensively 
and leaves the scene as soon as he can. In the second, the government leader feels that 
the very foundation of her country’s value system is challenged by the misdeeds of 
past governments, expresses empathy for the victimised group and then 
communicates her intention to make reparation to it. We call these two emotional 
reactions Image Shame and Moral Shame respectively. In this paper we investigate 
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the psychological reality of these two forms of shame in intergroup settings. We first 
show how, in intergroup contexts, these emotions can be distinguished from each 
other and from their closely related cousin, guilt. We propose that, controlling for the 
other form of shame, image-based shame is likely to be associated with primarily anti-
social tendencies while moral-based shame should be associated with  more pro-social 
orientations. Three empirical studies set in contemporary intergroup contexts provide 
support for these ideas. 
Group-based emotions 
Group-based emotions result from appraisals of actions or experiences on a 
group level: others in the ingroup do something, or have something done to them, and 
the emotion is felt by the individual group members (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; 
Iyer & Leach, 2008; E. R. Smith, 1993). How are such group-based emotions 
possible? An essential pre-requisite is that the individuals concerned have some level 
of identification with the ingroup in the particular situation in question. This is likely 
to happen when contextual factors make certain group identities salient and shift the 
situation from being ‘interpersonal’ to being ‘intergroup’ (Brown & Turner, 1981; 
Tajfel, 1978). Once that has occurred, then attributes and experiences of the group 
have the potential to become attributes and experiences of the individual group 
members through the process of self-stereotyping (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). E. R. Smith, Seger and Mackie (2007) also 
include group identification as a defining characteristic of what they term ‘group-
level’ emotions, and add three other descriptive criteria to help distinguish group-level 
from individual-level emotions: empirical distinctness, social convergence within the 
group and observable relationships with intergroup attitudes and behaviour. Whilst 
these additional criteria can be analytically useful, it is enough for many research 
Comment [T2]: implies causality 
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purposes to ensure that group identities are salient to be able to investigate correlates 
of group-based emotions.  In this research we focus on two group-based emotions in 
particular, guilt and shame.  
Guilt and Shame 
There are several ways in which guilt and shame have been distinguished in 
the literature (e.g., Gausel & Leach, 2011; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Teroni & 
Deonna, 2008). An early contribution was by Lewis (1971). While noting that both 
emotions were self-focussed and arose from a perception of one’s own failings or 
misdeeds, Lewis proposed that they differed in the degree to which the self is 
implicated: guilt results from a focus on the misdeed and how that action affected 
someone else, whereas shame results from a focus on the self, a feeling that one is 
flawed in some global way. In this scheme, guilt encourages the perpetrator to make 
reparation, whilst shame is more likely to lead to hiding, avoidance or even self-
defensive aggression.  
Others followed Lewis’ (1971) lead with research supporting shame’s sense of 
global worthlessness  and guilt’s more action-oriented sense of responsibility (e.g., 
Branscombe, Slugoski & Kappen, 2004; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). But this is not 
the only perspective that has been advanced to explain the shame-guilt difference. 
Some have suggested that guilt is more other-focused than shame. Baumeister and his 
colleagues, for instance, propose that guilt serves to strengthen and maintain social 
relationships by motivating perpetrators to make restitution to those they have 
wronged (Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994); shame has been proposed, by 
contrast, to reflect concerns for social status and inferiority in a hierarchy (Gilbert, 
2003).  
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Another distinction, focusing on the origin rather than outcome of the two 
emotions, claims that guilt more often arises internally, relative to shame’s greater 
responsiveness to social input (Fontaine, Luyten, De Boeck, Corveleyn, Fernandez, 
Herrera & Ittze, 2006; R. H. Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002). On this basis, 
guilt is often characterized as as more intimately related to morality than shame 
because it arises from a person’s own conscience rather than others’ disapproval. As 
we shall see, however, this may prove too sharp a contrast, since there may be reasons 
to distinguish two types of shame, one arising from “the public exposure of defects or 
transgressions” and the other from “a more private negative evaluation of the self” (R. 
H. Smith et al., 2002, p. 157). Although, derived from R. H. Smith and colleagues’ 
work on interpersonal transgressions, this distinction finds echoes in intergroup 
contexts, as we shall see.   
Finally, it has been suggested that guilt arises from norm violations - that is, in 
situations where people view their own behaviour or that of members of their group as 
flouting specific rules of conduct (e.g., failing to reciprocate a friend’s help).  In 
contrast, shame stems from more general failures to live up to one’s core values - that 
is, in situations where people perceive a behaviour or a trait of theirs or of members of 
their group as severely undermining one or more of the values  they hold (e.g., 
courage or generosity) and which partly define their identity (Teroni & Deonna, 
2008). Moreover, and independently of the sort of distinction that is emphasized, 
shame is commonly characterised as maladaptive and leading to self-defensive and 
avoidant reactions, while guilt is generally regarded as an emotion with more positive 
connotations and pro-social outcomes.  
Consistent with these hypotheses, in many studies of interpersonal relations, 
shame has been found to be linked to self-blame and avoidance responses (Roseman, 
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Wiest & Swartz, 1994; Smith et al., 2002; Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 1996), 
while guilt has often found to be associated with empathy and pro-social action 
tendencies (Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 1994; Tangney, 1991; Tangney et al., 
1996). However, the empirical consensus has been less than perfect. For instance, 
reparation is not always associated more with guilt than with shame (Roseman et al., 
1994; Tangney et al., 1996; Giner-Sorolla, Piazza, & Espinosa, 2011). Moreover, De 
Hooge, Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg, (2008) showed that shame episodes involving 
performance failures can motivate pro-social, relationship-enhancing interpersonal 
behaviour in situations where the shame was relevant to the decision at hand (i.e., in 
situations that are relevant to the shame-causing event). There is also evidence that 
guilt is sometimes linked to maladaptive outcomes, for example, depression (Luby et 
al., 2009; Meehan et al., 1996).  
Research on group-based guilt and shame reveals a similarly equivocal 
picture. Several studies have found that group members’ feelings of guilt about 
historical or contemporary ingroup misdeeds are, indeed, associated with intentions to 
make reparations to the wronged outgroup (e.g., Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & 
Čehajić, 2008; Brown & Čehajić, 2008; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 
1998; Harvey & Oswald, 2000; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Swim & Miller, 1999). 
However, Iyer, Schmader and Lickel (2007) found that feelings of guilt did not 
predict support for any reparative actions after accounting for feelings of shame and 
anger, while Leach, Iyer and Pederson (2006) and Harth, Kessler and Leach (2008) 
also found little connection between group-level guilt and reparative action. Similarly, 
Allpress, Barlow, Brown and Louis (2010) observed that, in the context of Australia’s 
apology to Aboriginal Australians, the predictive power of shame rendered guilt an 
ineffective predictor of collective political action.  
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Studies investigating the effects of group-based shame also provide mixed 
evidence. Consistent with the traditional viewpoint, Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, 
Scarnier and Ames (2005) and Schmader and Lickel (2006) showed that shame for 
others’ misdeeds was associated with a desire to distance oneself from both the 
situation and those responsible for the wrong-doing (Johns, Schmader & Lickel, 2005; 
Iyer et al., 2007). However, several other studies have found positive correlations 
between forms of group-based shame and reparation attitudes and other pro-social 
responses (Allpress et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2008; Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Gausel, 
Leach, Vignoles & Brown, 2012; Rees, Allpress & Brown, 2013; Schmader & Lickel, 
2006). Such findings, derived as they are from several quite different intergroup 
contexts, pose something of a puzzle for the view that guilt and shame should have 
opposite motivational consequences for social relations.  
Distinguishing Among Varieties of Shame 
The theoretical approach to shame we present here has been developed partly in an 
attempt to understand these apparently conflicting findings.  
We begin from a view that contrasts guilt and shame in the following manner 
(Deonna, Rodogno & Teroni, 2011; Teroni & Deonna, 2008). Guilt arises in contexts 
in which the person or the group perceives some behaviour as violating a norm. 
Because people typically adhere to a rule of conduct according to which, say, one 
ought not steal, they feel guilty over putting the money in their pocket. Shame, by 
contrast, occurs in contexts of more general failures to live up to one’s or the group’s 
core values, situations in which people (or members of a group) perceive some 
behaviour or trait of theirs (or their group) as severely undermining one or more of the 
values they hold and that make up who they are. For example, stealing might be 
regarded as a failure to live up to the honest person one aspires to be. Values in this 
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framework can thus be characterised as qualities of objects or circumstances – e.g., 
instances of honesty, justice and benevolence but also wealth, power, beauty and 
reputation - whose existence is favoured, desired or pursued. Values in this sense 
differ from the more specific norms or rules of conduct that are grounded in these 
values (cf. Rokeach, 1973).  To summarize, shame arising from a threatened value is a 
more general phenomenon than guilt – which attaches itself to a specific broken norm 
– but is a less general phenomenon than any feeling that would be based in a global 
sense of one’s individual or collective worthlessness. Hence, it need not be an all-
encompassing, debilitating emotion, as some viewpoints have suggested. We believe, 
instead, that the nature of shame will be determined more specifically by which value 
is threatened (Deonna et al., 2011, pp. 104-107). 
Becoming aware of a collective wrongdoing by one’s own group can raise two 
value concerns. One valued aspect of the ingroup is being well regarded in the world, 
that is, having a positive collective image, which knowledge of wrongdoing can 
threaten. This value is non-moral because the group would cease to pursue it if it 
thought it did not serve its own interests. It can be contrasted with another value of the 
ingroup, its status as, say, a group that is motivated by justice and benevolence. These 
constitute paradigmatic moral concerns because they entail that they should be 
pursued by members of the group even in occasions in which they do not advance the 
interest of the group. Therefore, we propose that feelings of shame that arise from the 
perception that one’s social image has been undermined – which we term Image 
Shame – will have different motivational effects from shame that arises from the 
perception that one’s moral standing has actually been undermined – which we term 
Moral Shame.  
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In Image Shame, the concern is solely with the image and reputation of the 
group, and only secondarily or not at all with the well-being of the victim group. To 
reach this goal, the most successful way to restore the ingroup’s valued social image, 
and to reduce the shame that arises from the judgement of others, is likely to involve 
avoidance and withdrawal from the critical gaze of others, in a hope that the issue will 
blow over. Someone might also adopt a defensive strategy of actively covering up the 
group’s misdeeds, if s/he believes such a strategy might reduce external blame of the 
group. As the concern in Image Shame lies with the restoration of the ingroup’s 
image, and not primarily or at all with the well-being of the victim group, a person 
experiencing this form of shame is unlikely to support opening themselves and their 
group up to further reparative commitments. The default preference, therefore, is 
likely to reflect an image-maintenance strategy characterised by avoidance and cover-
up. Feelings toward the victim group and the situation in general are likely to be 
hostile, because the emphasis is on how “they have made us look bad”, rather than on 
how “we need to treat them better”.  
It is not so easy, however, to avoid and forget the transgressions that give rise 
to Moral Shame, because the threat is to a moral value that has, typically, high self 
importance. Indeed, morality has even been identified as the most valued trait in one’s 
own group (Leach, Ellemers & Barreto, 2007). The coping strategy that is adopted in 
relation to Moral Shame will therefore reflect the relative importance the subject lends 
to the particular moral value. In this case, avoidance of the issue is unlikely to restore 
one’s moral standing in one’s own eyes. In order for Moral Shame to be reduced, an 
individual must be able to see the ingroup in positive moral terms. For this reason, an 
individual is most likely to adopt attitudes and behaviours that make up for the initial 
wrongdoing and restore the well-being of the victim group. Such a strategy is likely to 
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include a genuine support for apology and compensations, and openness to discussing 
and addressing the original transgression.  
Our analysis also provides some insight into the often-weak effects of guilt in 
intergroup contexts. Because of guilt’s connection with discrete acts of wrongdoing 
that violate norms, it will not promote the same kind of action that either moral or 
image shame do. If anything, it should relate to acts of reparation that are limited to 
compensation of the harm done to the victim (Deonna et al., 2011; Iyer, Leach & 
Crosby, 2003; Teroni & Deonna, 2008). This underscores our distinction between 
Moral Shame and guilt. Even though both are morally oriented, restorative emotions, 
the effects of guilt in an ongoing group-based context are likely to be weaker 
thanthose of Moral Shame. This is because the threat to one’s valued self-conception 
as moral should prove a more potent motivator of reparative behaviour, than should 
guilt’s concern over making good on a single act. A further factor likely to weaken the 
effects of group-based guilt is the reduced sense of personal responsibility for the 
misdeed. Unlike an interpersonal transgression, where I have done something wrong, 
I am less likely to feel responsibility for a malfeasance committed by other members 
of my group1. Moral shame, on the other hand, is more linked to my social identity as 
a member of a particular group. If I identify with that group, its properties and morals 
become mine, irrespective of any personal responsibility for its actions (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987).  
Gausel and Leach (2011) have developed views that likewise support the pro-
sociality of group-based shame. They argue that the mistake of the traditional 
viewpoint was to consider shame as constituting a global sense of failure. They also 
propose that shame has positive, reparative action outcomes, and is motivated by a 
threat specifically to the moral self-image – that is, the self’s conception of true 
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morality. Where our model differs, however, is in proposing Image Shame as a form 
of shame. Gausel and Leach (2011) see negative, withdrawal-related outcomes of 
self-conscious emotion as coming from global inferiority feelings and feelings of 
rejection, rather than shame (Gausel et al., 2012). Of these two, rejection is 
conceptually closest to Image Shame, because it is concerned with others’ view of the 
self.  
Existing Research and New Questions 
Initial evidence for these distinctions was provided by Allpress et al. (2010, 
Study 2), who distinguished between Moral Shame2, Image Shame and Guilt. Both 
Moral Shame and Guilt were significant positive correlates of support for 
compensation being offered to Kenyans by the British government for British 
atrocities in Kenya during the Mau Mau rebellion. Image Shame was negatively (and 
non-significantly) correlated with support for compensation, once guilt and Moral 
Shame were controlled for. Two subsequent studies, covering contemporary 
Germans’ feelings about the Holocaust and Britons’ feelings about their country’s 
involvement in the war in Iraq, showed that, when included in the same structural 
model, Image Shame and Moral Shame were differently associated with prejudice 
towards a secondary ‘victim’ group – i.e., not the outgroup that was the target of the 
original ingroup mistreatment (Rees et al., 2013). Image Shame was positively related 
to social distancing from the outgroup, while Moral Shame was negatively associated 
with social distancing from the same outgroup.  
In two studies examining Norwegians’ feelings about the mistreatment of the 
Tater minority, Gausel et al. (2012) showed that it was possible to distinguish their 
new conception of shame from feelings of inferiority and social rejection. The latter 
emotion was positively correlated with tendencies to avoid or cover up the Tater issue 
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and negatively related to pro-social orientations such as empathy for the Tater and a 
desire to make some kind of restitution. In contrast, shame revealed an exactly 
opposite pattern: a negative relationship with avoidance and cover up, positive with 
pro-sociality. Guilt proved largely unrelated to either outcome measure in a structural 
model that also included shame, rejection and inferiority.  
Apart from testing whether negative outcomes are best attributed to rejection 
or image shame, our research also builds on previous research that has established 
only cross-sectional correlational links between image shame and negative outcomes 
(Allpress et al., 2010; Gausel et al., 2012; Rees et al., 2013). To gather evidence more 
suggestive of causal patterns over time, therefore, our Study 3 adopts a longitudinal 
design. 
Before stating our hypotheses, a short statistical comment is in order. Because 
the self-conscious emotions we are studying here stem from an initial appraisal that 
the group has behaved illegitimately towards others, they are all likely to be positively 
correlated with one another. Indeed, it is quite possible to respond to a group 
wrongdoing with concerns for the implied norm violation (guilt), and for both the 
ingroup’s image (Image Shame) and its moral standing (Moral Shame). The semantic 
similarity of the emotion words ‘shame’ and ‘guilt’ (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & 
O’Connor, 1987) will further contribute to a co-variation among measures. Thus, in 
order to be able to distinguish between these emotions empirically, it is essential that 
a multivariate approach is adopted in which the independent associations of each 
emotion are assessed, controlling for the other emotions. Indeed, such a practice has 
long been adopted in the emotion literature, ever since Tangney et al.’s (1992) 
suggestion to study ‘shame-free guilt’ and ‘guilt-free shame’. As we shall see, 
although the three different emotions may have similarly signed bivariate 
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relationships with the dependent measures of interest, once their shared variance is 
controlled for, differently valenced relationships with the dependent measures 
emerge. Of course, with such statistical ‘suppression’ effects, it is important to be 
precise and also cautious about the claims that are being made about the nature of the 
underlying relationships (Lynam, Hoyle & Neman, 2006). In this case, our hypotheses 
about the divergent associations between Image and Moral Shame and positive and 
negative intergroup orientations refer specifically to the associations with those 
intergroup outcomes once the shared variance with the related emotions has been 
partialled out. 
In the light of the arguments advanced above, we tested the following hypotheses in 
three studies: 
1. When controlling for each other, group-based Moral and Image Shame will be 
differently related to positive and negative orientations towards a (victim) 
outgroup: Moral Shame will be positively associated with positive orientations 
and inversely related to negative orientations; Image Shame will show an opposite 
pattern of associations. 
2. When controlling for both varieties of shame, group-based Guilt is expected to 
resemble, if anything, Moral Shame’s pattern of associations but with weaker ties 
to the outcome measures. 
Study 1 
The aim of Study 1 was to develop measures of group-based Moral and Image Shame 
to establish that they can be separated empirically both from each other and from 
group-based Guilt. It also addresses an important issue raised above, namely the 
difference between the conception of shame proposed here and that advanced by 
Gausel and Leach (2011). We then explored the relationships of these group-based 
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emotions with both positive and negative intergroup orientations towards a harmed 
outgroup.  
The intergroup context was the recent war in Iraq in which some well 
documented and systematic abuses of Iraqi prisoners by British soldiers had occurred. 
By first presenting research participants with an incident from that war, and by 
phrasing all our emotion and social orientation items in terms of one or both of the 
groups concerned (Britain, Iraq), we ensured that the context was genuinely 
‘intergroup’, that some minimal level of group identification would be instigated, and 
hence that group-based emotions would be in play. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and fifty nine British students were recruited as participants. Of 
those, 147 (73 male, 72 female, 2 unspecified; age range, 18-28 years, mean 20.0) 
participants who self-identified as “British” were included in the final analysis.  
Procedure 
Participants were asked (in early 2009) if they would like to fill out a 
questionnaire on their attitudes toward Britain’s involvement in the war in Iraq. The 
questionnaire consisted of a newspaper article, ostensibly sourced from the Guardian 
– a reputable British newspaper – followed by the dependent variables. The article 
gave an account of prisoner abuse carried out by British soldiers in Iraq (Amnesty 
International, 2007; Red Cross (ICRC), 2004). Participation was voluntary and 
anonymous but participants could enter a prize draw for one of two £30 prizes in 
return for their participation.  
Measures 
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All items were measured on nine-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 9 (strongly agree).  
Moral Shame was measured, adapting items from Brown et al. (2008), by 
asking participants how much they agreed (or disagreed) with the following three 
statements: (1) “Our treatment of Iraqi people makes me feel somewhat ashamed 
about what it means to be British”, (2) “I do not feel ashamed to be British for the 
way we have treated the Iraqi people” (reversed), and (3) “I feel ashamed for the 
aggressive tendency of British people”, α = .82. 
Image Shame was measured, again modifying items from Brown et al. (2008), 
by asking participants how much they agreed (or disagreed) with the following three 
statements: (1) “I feel disgraced because the behaviour of British people toward Iraqi 
people has created a bad image of Britain in the eyes of the world”, (2) “To think how 
Britain is seen for its treatment of Iraqi people makes me feel ashamed”, and (3) “I 
feel humiliated when I think of how Britain is seen negatively by the rest of the world 
for how it has treated the Iraqi people”, α = .85. 
Guilt was measured by slightly amending three items from Brown et al. 
(2008): (l) “I feel guilty for the manner in which Iraqi people have been treated by 
British”, (2) “Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behaviour of 
British toward Iraqis”, and (3) “I feel guilty for the bad living conditions of the Iraqi 
people”, α = .89. 
Rejection was measured using adaptations of three items used by Gausel et al. 
(2012): “I feel rejected when I think about what has happened to the Iraqis”, “As a 
Brit, I feel withdrawn when I think about what has happened to the Iraqis” and “I feel 
alone when I think about what has happened to the Iraqis”, α = .78. 
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Two measures of a positive orientation towards the outgroup were devised: 
Support for apology was measured with “I think that the British government should 
apologise for the atrocities committed against the Iraqi people”, and support for 
financial compensation with “I think that the British government should compensate 
Iraqis financially for injustices that have occurred during the invasion”. As measures 
of a negative orientation towards the outgroup we included: issue avoidance, “I wish 
that people would stop going on about the invasion of Iraq”, and anger, “I am angry 
that the Iraq situation is being talked about so often”.  
Results 
 
Means and correlations between the variables are presented in Table 1. To test 
the hypothesised models we performed CFA and SEM analyses using MPlus (version 
6). Missing values were estimated using Maximum Likelihood (ML).  
Confirmatory factor analyses were performed to assess the factor structure of 
the items measuring Moral Shame, Image Shame and Guilt. In all models the factors 
were allowed to correlate but no observed items were allowed to cross-load. The 
hypothesised model, specifying Image Shame, Moral Shame and Guilt as separate 
factors provided a good fit to the data, χ² (24) = 37.72, p = .037, CFI = .982, SRMR = 
.032, RMSEA = .063. An alternative model that specified the Moral and Image 
Shame items as loading onto a single “shame” factor, in addition to a Guilt factor, 
showed a significant decrease in fit, ∆χ² (2) = 44.52, p < .001, ∆AIC = 40.524. A third 
model, in which all emotion items loaded onto one omnibus “negative emotion” 
factor also proved inferior, ∆χ² (3) = 129.91, p < .001, ∆AIC = 123.19. Thus, the data 
supported Hypothesis 1 in showing that Image Shame, Moral Shame, and Guilt can 
properly be regarded as separable emotion scales. 
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In order to determine the relationship between Image Shame and feelings of 
Rejection, a further analysis was conducted, similar to those reported above. A four-
factor measurement model, with Image Shame, Rejection, Moral Shame and Guilt 
specified as separate factors, fitted the data well, χ
2 
(38) = 64.60, p = .005, CFI = .969, 
RMSEA = .069. Crucially, this model proved to be superior to a three-factor model 
where Image Shame and Rejection were specified as a single factor, Δχ
2 
(3) = 89.32, p 
< .001, ΔAIC = 83.32, indicating that feelings of Image Shame are neither reducible 
to, nor better explained as, feelings of Rejection. 
To test our hypothesis about the relationship between the emotion variables 
and measures of negative (a latent variable consisting of avoidance and anger items) 
and positive (consisting of support for apology and support for compensation) 
orientations, we evaluated the structural model shown in Figure 1. This model, in 
which all paths were specified between the emotions and the two response types, 
provided a reasonable fit to the data, χ² (9) = 16.09, p = .065, CFI = .984, RMSEA = 
.074. As hypothesised, Moral Shame was a significant positive predictor of positive 
responses (β = .44, p < .001), and a significant negative predictor of negative 
responses (β = -.70, p < .001). In contrast, Image Shame positively predicted negative 
responses (β = .21, p < .05), but was unrelated to adaptive, positive measures (β = .04, 
p > .05). Guilt was not significantly related to either positive (β = .11, p > .05) or 
negative responses (β = -.04, p > .05). It is noteworthy that Rejection was not 
significantly related to either positive (β = .14, p > .05) or negative (β = -.05, p > .05) 
orientations.  
Discussion 
The results of Study 1 provided support for our hypotheses in a new 
intergroup context. They confirmed that it is possible to separate Moral Shame, Image 
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Shame and Guilt as distinct group-based emotions, and these different emotions were 
differently associated with positive and negative intergroup orientations (support for 
apology and compensation, versus anger and avoidance) when tested simultaneously 
in the same structural model. Guilt was unrelated to either positive or negative 
intergroup orientation, once the two forms of shame were partialled out. Importantly, 
these results obtained whilst controlling for felt Rejection which was not itself 
independently associated with either dependent variable. This latter finding suggests 
that there may be some merit in using Image Shame, over and above rejection, as a 
way to explain defensive and hostile orientations toward a situation of collective 
shaming (cf. Gausel et al., 2012). We return to this issue in the General Discussion.  
Study 2 
In order to refine our measures of group-based Image and Moral Shame, a 
further study was conducted, again using atrocities committed by British troops in 
Iraq as the emotion instigating context. Hitherto, the focus in our items was to contrast 
Image Shame from a more general measure of shame that would tap Moral Shame. 
However, we recognized that it would be desirable to create measures that more 
explicitly mentioned these key concepts. We also included an additional measure of 
negative social orientation, the wish to cover up the crimes committed by the ingroup, 
a measure suggested by Gausel et al. (2012).   
Method 
Participants  
Two hundred and fifty six psychology students participated for partial course credit. 
The survey was hosted on the Bristol Online Survey system and participants were 
invited to complete the study online via the host department’s participant management 
system. Of those recruited, 252 (45 male, 207 female; age range 16-43 years, mean 
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20.0) participants who self-identified as “British” were included in the final analysis.  
Procedure  
Participants were informed that the survey was investigating attitudes toward Britain’s 
involvement in the invasion of Iraq and that their participation was voluntary. They 
were presented with excerpts from a real BBC News article on the treatment of Iraqi 
prisoners (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8266699.stm), followed by the dependent 
measures3. Participants were debriefed following completion of the questionnaire.  
Measures  
All items were measured on seven-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree).  
Moral Shame was measured using three items: “I feel ashamed because 
Britain’s actions with regard to Iraq have been immoral”, “I feel ashamed to be 
British for the way we have treated the Iraqi people”, and “I feel ashamed for the 
damage done to Iraqi people by Brits”, α = .85.  
Image Shame was measured using five items: “I feel ashamed because Britain 
has a damaged reputation”, “I feel ashamed when I realise that other countries might 
think of Britain negatively because of our involvement in Iraq”, “I feel disgraced 
because the behaviour of British people toward Iraqi people has created a bad image 
of Britain in the eyes of the world”, “To think how Britain is seen for its treatment of 
Iraqi people makes me feel ashamed”, and “I feel humiliated when I think of how 
Britain is seen negatively by the rest of the world for how it has treated the Iraqi 
people”, α = .93.  
Guilt was measured using the same three items as in Study 1, α = .89.  
Support for apology, support for financial compensation, issue avoidance and 
anger were all measured using the same items as Study 1.  
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Cover-up was measured with three items adapted from Gausel et al. (2012): “I 
think that we Brits should make it less clear what has happened to the Iraqi people”, 
“I think that we Brits need to be careful of sharing national information with other 
nations”, and “We Brits should make the Iraq issue become less important in the 
public awareness”, α = .79.  
Results 
The means of and correlations among the variables are reported in Table 2. 
A three-factor model specifying Image Shame, Moral Shame and guilt 
provided a reasonable fit to the data, χ
2 
(41) = 100.01, p < .001, CFI = .972, SRMR = 
.036, RMSEA = .076. This three-factor model proved to be superior to the three 
alternative models evaluated in the previous two studies: when Image Shame and 
Moral Shame were combined: Δχ
2 
(2) = 176.61, p < .001, ΔAIC = 172.61; when 
Moral Shame and guilt were combined: Δχ
2 
(2) = 233.48, p < .001, ΔAIC = 229.48; 
and when all variables were combined into one factor: Δχ
2 
(3) = 518.24, p < .001, 
ΔAIC = 512.24.  
A structural model similar to that evaluated in Study 1 was then examined, 
with the exception that cover-up was included in the negative social orientations latent 
variable (see Figure 2). This model fit the data very well, χ
2 
(13) = 15.89, p = .255, 
CFI = .996, SRMR = .032, RMSEA = .030. Moral Shame was again associated with 
decreased negative orientations ( a latent variable consisting of anger, avoidance and  
a desire to cover up the ingroup’s misdeeds; β = -.32, p < .001). Additionally, Moral 
Shame was again associated with positive responses (β = .60, p < .001). As in study 1, 
Image Shame was correlated with negative outcomes (β = .20, p < .01). Also, Guilt 
was positively associated (β = .25, p < .01), and Image Shame was negatively 
associated (β = -.18, p < .05), with positive outcomes. Guilt was not, however, 
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significantly related to negative outcome measures (β = -.13, p = .11). 
Multicollinearity statistics were all within normal ranges, all variance inflation factors 
< 1.93 and tolerances > .51 
Discussion 
These findings corroborate the findings of Study 1 with regard to the divergent 
predictive effects of group-based Moral and Image Shame. Again, the data clearly 
showed that, once their shared variance was accounted for, Moral Shame was 
associated with positive outcomes, whereas Image Shame was associated with 
negative outcomes. This study extends the previous work with a larger sample and 
demonstrates that the latter outcomes can also include a wish to ‘cover up’ the 
misdeeds of the ingroup.  
Although group-based guilt, unlike in Study 1, was significantly associated 
with positive outcomes in the structural model, its effect size was much lower than 
that of Moral Shame (βs = .25 and .60 respectively). The newly-found statistical 
significance of guilt (controlling for Moral Shame and Image Shame) can probably 
best be attributed to increasing the sample size and hence statistical power. As noted 
earlier, this picture is consistent with the literature on group-based guilt, which shows 
its associations to be often limited in the presence of other, more influential emotions, 
such as shame or anger (e.g., Gausel et al., 2012; Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006; 
Rees et al., 2013). 
Study 3 
Studies 1 and 2, like the vast majority in the group-based emotions literature, 
employed a cross-sectional correlational design with all its attendant interpretative 
difficulties. Indeed, thus far, all the studies that have found divergent correlations for 
group-based Moral and Image Shame (or a variant thereof) have suffered from this 
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limitation (Gausel et al., 2012; Rees et al., 2013). In order to fill this gap in the 
literature, Study 3 employed a cross-lagged longitudinal design, following the 
example of Brown et al. (2008). Such a design permits slightly stronger inferences 
about the directionality of observed associations between presumed antecedents and 
presumed outcomes (Bijleveld & Kamp, 1998). 
The hypotheses were as in the previous studies, although this time we 
predicted that the relationships between the emotion variables and the intergroup 
orientation measures would hold over time, and be stronger from emotions to 
intergroup orientations than vice versa.  
Method 
Participants  
Data were collected at two time points, approximately four weeks apart. At Time 1, a 
community sample of 427 was recruited via an online survey. Of these respondents, 
28 were excluded because they did not self-identify as “British”, leaving a final initial 
sample of 399 participants (246 males and 153 females; age range 19-81 years, mean 
48.0). This survey was run through a rewards-based online shopping network, in 
which users receive rewards points for completing surveys, entering competitions and 
purchasing items through the system’s website. Participants were awarded points to 
the approximate value of £2 for completing the survey. The survey was hosted on the 
Bristol Online Survey system and participants were invited to complete the survey 
through an external link.  
Four weeks after completing the initial questionnaire, the 399 participants who 
self-identified as British were invited to complete a follow-up study. They were again 
paid the equivalent of £2 for their participation. A total of 293 (73%) participants 
completed the survey again at Time 2 and was used in the final analysis (M = 186, F = 
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107; age range 19-81, mean 48.0).  
Procedure  
Data were collected in late 2010 and early 2011. Participants were told that the 
survey was for university research purposes only and would not be used in any 
political context. Participants were informed that they would be asked to read a BBC 
article about Britain’s involvement in the invasion of Iraq and then answer some 
questions about their thoughts and feelings about the war. Participants read an article 
on the maltreatment of Baha Mousa and other Iraqi prisoners by the British army 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8266699.stm). The article was followed by the 
dependent variables.  
British participants who filled out the survey at Time 1 were invited four 
weeks later to complete a follow-up study. They were told that they had recently 
completed a survey on their attitudes toward Britain’s involvement in Iraq and that we 
were interested in how their attitudes may have changed over the last month. They 
were also informed that some of the questions may be similar to the survey they filled 
out previously. They were asked to answer each question with how they were feeling 
in that moment. The subsequent instructions, article and questions were identical to 
the survey at Time 1. 
Measures  
All items were measured using seven-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree).  
Moral Shame (α = .94), Image Shame (α = .96), Guilt (α = .90), support for 
apology, support for financial compensation, issue avoidance, anger and cover-up (α = 
.78) were measured using the same items as Study 2. As in Study 2, support for 
apology and compensation were treated as indicators for the latent variable ‘positive 
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intergroup orientation’; issue avoidance, anger and cover-up were treated as indicators 
for the latent variable ‘negative intergroup orientation’.  
Results 
In order to evaluate whether there were any differences between those who completed 
both time points and those who completed the study only at Time 1, a MANOVA on 
the T1 data set was conducted, using all dependent measures, gender and age as 
dependent measures. Using Pillai’s trace, there was a significant omnibus difference 
between the two samples, V = .05, F (10, 388) = 1.87, p < .05. However, inspection 
of the univariate effects revealed a marginally significant difference between samples 
on only one variable: anger that the issue of British troops’ behaviour in the Iraq war 
was being discussed: those who chose not to repeat the study at T2 were slightly more 
angry at Time 1 (M = 3.89) than those who completed the survey twice (M = 3.55), p 
< .06.  
Means of and inter-correlations among all variables are shown in Tables 3 to 
5. As can be seen, there was a slight decrease in mean levels of all variables over time 
(Table 3). A repeated measures MANOVA revealed that there was a significant 
omnibus effect of time, F (5, 288) = 2.85, p < .05. This omnibus effect was driven by 
significant temporal decreases in both Moral Shame, F (1, 292) = 11.02, p < .01, and 
positive orientation, F (1, 292) = 5.17, p < .05.  
 As with Studies 1 and 2, confirmatory factor analyses were performed to 
assess the factor structure of the items measuring Moral Shame, Image Shame and 
Guilt. CFA analyses were conducted on Time 1 data. In all models the factors were 
allowed to correlate but no observed items were allowed to cross-load. The 
hypothesised model, specifying Image Shame, Moral Shame and Guilt as separate 
factors provided a reasonable fit to the data, χ² (41) = 126.71, p < .001, CFI = .978, 
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SRMR = .022, RMSEA = .085. An alternative model that specified the Moral and 
Image Shame items as loading onto a single “shame” factor, in addition to a 
Guilt factor, again showed a significant decrease in fit, ∆χ² (2) = 160.00, p < .001, 
∆AIC = 164.00. A third model, in which all emotion items loaded onto one omnibus 
“negative emotion” factor provided a dramatically worse fit, ∆χ² (3) = 453.24, p < 
.001, ∆AIC = 459.24. The three factor model of Image Shame, Moral Shame, and 
Guilt was therefore again supported, despite the relatively high correlations among 
them (Table 4). 
To test our hypotheses about the effects of emotions at Time 1 on measures of 
negative and positive orientations at Time 2, the structural model shown in Figure 3 
was evaluated. In this model, positive and negative orientations at Time 2 were 
predicted by the three emotions scales at Time 1, controlling for both positive and 
negative orientations at Time 1 (Bijleveld & van der Kamp, 1998). This model 
provided a very good fit to the data, χ
2
(42) = 51.62, p = .15, CFI = .997, SRMR = 
.023, RMSEA = .028. Moral Shame at Time 1 predicted significantly less negativity 
at Time 2 (β = -.22, p < .05), while Image Shame at Time 1 predicted more negativity 
at Time 2 (β = .18, p < .05). No other path between the emotions at Time 1 and 
responses at Time 2 was significant. 
Unsurprisingly, the test-retest associations were strong for both positive and 
negative orientations (β = .80 and β = .69, respectively, both ps < .001). Positive 
orientation at Time 1 was also (negatively) associated with negative orientation at 
Time 2 (β = -.22, p < .05). However, negative orientation at Time 1 was not 
correlated with positive orientation at Time 2 (β = -.06, n.s.). 
The above results are suggestive of a directional relationship between Moral 
and Image Shame and negative intergroup orientations. To explore this possibility 
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further, a second model, in which Time 2 Moral Shame, Image Shame and guilt were 
predicted from Time 1 positive and negative orientations (controlling for Time 1 
emotions), was examined. This model did not fit the data well, χ
2
(28) = 190.34, p < 
.001, CFI = .938, SRMR = .235, RMSEA = .141. Negative orientations at Time 1 did 
not predict any of the emotions at Time 2, all ps > .65. The absence of reverse 
longitudinal relationships is consistent with the hypothesis that the direction of these 
associations runs from emotions to intergroup orientation. 
Discussion 
In this study we have shown for the first time that the divergent effects of group-based 
Moral and Image Shame on intergroup orientations can be observed longitudinally. 
Admittedly, these were only reliable on the negative orientation measure, but it is 
striking that their opposite valences bore out the cross-sectional relationships in 
Studies 1 and 2, and that have been reported elsewhere (Rees et al., 2013). Moreover, 
the associations in the reverse direction (from orientation to emotions) were far from 
significant.  
It is notable that group-based guilt had no reliable longitudinal associations 
with either intergroup orientation measure, broadly confirming an emerging picture 
from the research presented here and elsewhere that, once Moral and Image Shame 
are controlled, group-based guilt seems to be a less influential emotion (Allpress et 
al., 2010; Iyer et al., 2007; Gausel et al., 2012; Leach et al., 2006; Rees et al., 2013). 
The absence of a longitudinal ‘effect’ of guilt here contrasts with the only other 
published longitudinal research on group-based emotions where, in two studies of 
attitudes towards an indigenous group in Chile, guilt and not shame proved to have 
reliable associations over time with a measure of reparation (Brown et al., 2008). 
Although the many contextual and methodological differences between those studies 
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impede any definitive analysis, it should be noted that, in that earlier research, Moral 
and Image Shame had not yet been fully distinguished, either conceptually or 
psychometrically. It is thus possible that their effects on intergroup attitudes in the 
Brown et al. (2008) study cancelled each other out. Note, too, that Brown et al. (2008) 
did not have a measure of negative intergroup orientation.  
One possible limitation of this study are the relatively high correlations 
amongst the emotion variables (.72 to .86, median .80), a possible indication of 
multicollinearity. There are four  points to note about this issue. Firstly, the findings 
of this study were strikingly consistent with those from Studies 1 and 2 where the 
inter-correlations were lower (.51 to .67, median .57).Second, and again consistent 
with Studies 1 and 2 (and Rees et al., 2013), despite the inter-correlations, a three-
factor solution (Guilt, Image Shame, Moral Shame) proved superior to either 
plausible alternative. Thirdly, the relatively large sample size of the study offers some 
protection against any potential effects of multicollinearity (O’Brien, 2007). Fourthly, 
regression analyses (not reported here) show that the collinearity statistics were all 
within normal ranges, all variance inflation factors < 4.20 and tolerances > .24. This 
suggests that multicollinearity did not unduly influence the results obtained.  
General Discussion 
The three studies presented here provide converging evidence for Image Shame, 
Moral Shame and Guilt as distinct group-based emotional experiences with different 
motivational associations in intergroup contexts. When controlling for Image Shame 
and Guilt, Moral Shame had reliable associations with both positive and negative 
orientations (but in opposite directions). In contrast, once Moral Shame and Guilt 
were partialled out, Image Shame was consistently and positively correlated with a 
negative orientation to the victim group and, somewhat less consistently, inversely 
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associated with a positive orientation. The associations with negative orientation for 
both forms of shame survived the more stringent test of longitudinal analysis. Guilt 
was a much weaker and less consistent correlate of either intergroup measure.  
One objection to our findings could be that our Image Shame measures 
included, in addition to items using the word “shame” (and variants), other items 
using semantically related concepts such as “humiliated” and “disgraced,” while our 
Moral Shame measures only used the word “shame.” Perhaps, then, Image Shame 
was really measuring one of those other emotions. However, empirically, the Image 
Shame measures always cohered internally and, while correlated with Moral Shame, 
consistently could be distinguished from it. If Image Shame really had little to do with 
shame then its “shame” items would have loaded along linguistic lines, with the other 
“shame” items in Moral Shame. This also suggests that “humiliated” and “disgraced” 
are semantically appropriate terms to study a form of shame that we believe to be 
more concerned with social reputation, as shown by their close relationship to items 
using the word “shame” in an image context. Indeed, humiliation has been shown to 
be in some ways similar to shame, but with less internalization – that is, involving the 
belief that the damage to one’s image is unjust (Leidner, Sheikh & Ginges, 2012). 
From this analysis, “humiliated” appears as an appropriate word to characterize Image 
Shame but not Moral Shame. 
Theoretical implications 
Our findings have a number of theoretical implications for the understanding 
of group-based shame and guilt. In the present paper we have outlined a distinction 
between shame and guilt in which shame is characterised by a perceived threat to 
one’s values and a focus on the self, whereas guilt is characterised by violated norms 
and a focus on specific behaviour. An important advantage of our model is that it 
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allows consideration of different forms of shame that arise from threats to different 
values. Our research highlights that the values of social image and moral standing are 
important in motivating distinct intergroup attitudes and behaviours. Given the 
empirical inconsistencies within the shame literature, we believe that the distinction 
between Image Shame and Moral Shame is of particular importance for our 
understanding of shame.  
Shame has traditionally been viewed as being associated with hiding, 
withdrawal and other maladaptive outcomes (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In addition 
to the three studies presented here, a growing number of studies have now challenged 
this view by demonstrating the pro-social correlates of group-based shame (Allpress 
et al., 2010; Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Gausel et al., 2012; Rees et al., 2013). These 
findings confirm the ‘pluralist’ approach of Teroni and Deonna (2008), which allows 
for the possibility that different forms of shame arise as a function of which type of 
self-relevant value has been undermined by the subject, and that these different forms 
of shame may drive behaviour in different ways. We have documented this here in 
connection with the contrast between positive and negative orientations.  
As we have seen, the nature of the value at stake in shame is one important 
determinant of the direction of its motivational influence. The data are quite clear that, 
once their shared variance is partialled out, shame arising from a threatened social 
image is associated with negative outcomes, whereas shame arising from a threatened 
moral standing is associated with positive outcomes. Still, two pending issues should 
be addressed. First, how does our conceptualisation of Image Shame relate to Gausel 
and Leach’s (2011) feeling of rejection? Second, what are the consequences of the 
fact that Image Shame can sometimes be ‘managed’ by adopting a reparation-like 
stance?  
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On the first point, are the experiences of Image Shame and Rejection simply 
labelled differently but qualitatively identical, or do these experiences differ in some 
important way? Furthermore, if distinct experiences, might they be different steps in a 
negative cascade of events that stem from threatened social image (i.e., Image 
Shame feelings of rejection  negative responses)? The present studies were not 
designed to investigate these questions, but we believe these are fruitful issues for 
future research. 
 On the second point, it is possible that in some contexts, group members 
feeling Image Shame might, indeed, seek to present reparation-like attitudes to restore 
their damaged reputation (as speculated by Brown et al., 2008). There are 
circumstances when this may happen, especially when (feigning) to act positively is 
perceived as the best means to manage one’s image. By contrast, given what Moral 
Shame is, its relation with positive behaviour will of course be less flexible. While 
restoring the moral balance can and will take many forms depending on the 
circumstances, it must necessarily be done through (what the subject perceives as) 
morally good behaviour. In one study reported in Brown et al. (2008, Study 3), a 
cross-sectional association between shame and reparation seemed to be partially 
mediated by ‘reputation management’. The authors concluded then that a desire to 
manage or improve the ingroup’s public image could be one – albeit short-term – 
strategy that group members could adopt to deal with feelings of shame. Two 
observations are worth making here: first, in that earlier research, although the 
measure of shame used comprised aspects of the two varieties of shame that we now 
distinguish, in the analyses then employed they were simply combined into a single 
measure. Thus, at an empirical level, it is impossible to disentangle what was driving 
the observed mediation effect. Moreover, there was no measure of negative outgroup 
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orientation in any of the studies reported by Brown et al. (2008) which might have 
detected (image) shame’s relationship with a less positive intergroup attitude. Second, 
the authors of that study were not aware of the theoretical account being developed by 
Teroni and Deonna (only published in 2008), nor self-evidently of the later analysis 
by Gausel and Leach (2011). In other words, the field has moved on. Our argument 
now is that, notwithstanding the hypotheses and data published in Brown et al. (2008), 
it is unlikely that Image Shame can usually be sustainably ‘managed’ by making 
gestures designed to improve the ingroup’s reputation, although in some 
circumstances this may still occur. A more probable reaction, we believe, will be to 
distance themselves from the discomforting misdeeds or to seek other ways to deflect 
attention from them. 
An important implication of our findings concerns the complex effects of 
‘shaming’ on perpetrator groups. Our data suggest that the public shaming of 
perpetrator groups can sometimes increase negativity by provoking such reactions as 
anger, avoidance, attempts to cover-up the ingroup’s wrong-doing and victim blame. 
We speculate whether the common tactic of ‘naming and shaming’ may not always 
promote positive reactions. Combs, Campbell, Jackson and Smith (2010) provide 
evidence from settings involving interpersonal transgressions that this may, indeed, be 
the case. Combs and colleagues found that vignettes or personal recollections of 
wrong-doings involving severe public chastisement evoked increased feelings of 
humiliation, anger and unfairness, as compared to private chastisement; shame and 
guilt were much less affected by such public reprimands. Combs et al. (2010) argue, 
as we do here, that the emotions of guilt and (moral) shame need to be distinguished 
from humiliation (or image shame). It is the latter emotion especially that is likely to 
be instigated in ‘naming and shaming’, with potentially adverse social consequences. 
Running head: MORAL SHAME AND IMAGE SHAME 33 
The preceding analysis highlights the particular importance of shame 
experiences and expressions in instances of intergroup wrongdoing. Our data show 
that the common conception of shame as a universally maladaptive emotion does not 
capture fully the diversity of motivations to which it is connected. Shame that arises 
from a tarnished social image is indeed associated with avoidance, anger, cover-up 
and victim blame, and is likely to have negative effects on intergroup relations. On the 
other hand, shame that arises in response to violations of the ingroup’s valued moral 
essence is strongly associated with a positive pattern of responses and is likely to have 
positive effects on intergroup relations.   
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Footnotes 
1. We are grateful to a reviewer for making this point. 
2. In the previous study, the term Essence Shame was used instead of Moral 
Shame. This reflects an earlier stage of theoretical development in this domain. 
3. Participants were also assigned to one of five experimental conditions that 
asked participants to perform: a personal morality affirmation, a personal non-moral 
affirmation, a group morality affirmation, a group non-moral affirmation, or a control 
writing task. These experimental conditions did not affect any of the variables 
investigated in the present study, all Fs < 2.04, all ps > .05, and are not discussed 
further. 
4. As a rule of thumb, an AIC difference of < 2 indicates no meaningful difference 
between models; between 4 and 7 indicates considerable evidence that the model with 
the lower AIC is better; and a difference of > 10 indicates substantial support for the 
model with the lower AIC (Burnham & Anderson, 2002).  
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Table 1 
Study 1: Means of and inter-correlations among variables  
 M SD 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 









































 -.08 -.12 
5. Apology 
support  














7. Avoidance 3.22 2.06       .69
**
 
8. Anger 2.95 1.97        
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Table 2 
Study 2: Means of and inter-correlations among variables  
 M SD 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 



















  -.15* .01 -.05 
































7. Anger 3.11 1.53       .51
**
 
8. Cover-up 2.85 1.21        
 
*p <.05  
**p < .01  
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Table 3 












                                      T1 SD  T2  SD       
Moral Shame 4.36  1.61  4.13  1.63   
    
Image shame  4.09  1.54  3.99  1.59   
    
Guilt  3.68  1.62  3.59  1.59   
    
Positive orientation 4.01  1.80  3.88  1.74   
    
Negative orientation 3.48  1.30  3.46  1.29   
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Table 4 
Study 3: Cross-sectional intercorrelations at T1 and T2 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1. Moral Shame   .85 .72 .65 -.36 
2. Image Shame  .86  .74 .58 -.31 
3. Guilt  .80 .81  .52 -.24 
4. Positive orient.  .66 .58 .65  -.51 
5. Negative orient.  -.36 -.20 -.29 -.53  
Allcorrelations significant, p < .01  
Above diagonal, correlations at T1; below diagonal, correlations at T2. 
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Table 5 
Study 3: longitudinal correlations 
  Time 1 








T2 Moral Shame  .78 .74 .66 .61 -.34 
T2 Image Shame  .67 .73 .65 .51 -.26 
T2 Guilt  .66 .65 .72 .59 -.30 
T2 Positive 
orient. 
 .60 .55 .51 .83 -.49 
T2 Negative 
orient. 
 -.38 -.28 -.21 -.52 .75 
 
All correlations, p < .01 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1.Study 1: Relationships among emotions and positive and negative 
orientations. 
* p < .05, ** p < .001   
Figure 2. Study 2: Relationships among emotions and positive and negative 
orientations. 
* p ≤ .05, ** p < .001 
Figure 3. Study 3: Longitudinal relationships among emotions and positive and 
negative orientations. 
* p ≤ .05, ** p < .001 
 
















































































Note, error terms for items making up positive and negative response tendencies were 
allowed to covary over time, but these covariances are not shown in this diagram for 
the sake of clarity. That is, apology support at T1 was allowed to covary with apology 
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support at T2, cover-up at T1 was allowed to covary with cover-up at Time 2, and so 
on (variables were only allowed to covary with the same variable across time, no 
cross-loading was allowed). This was done to reflect the stability over time of aspects 
of these variables that are not captured by the latent variables measuring positive and 
negative response tendencies. 
